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The Centrefor Refugee Studies (CRS) held a 
discussion of the new amendments to the 
Immigration Act.  A transcript of the 
discussion is presented. 
RETROACTIVITY 
[Anyone whose application is already in 
progress at the time the legislation is 
proclaimed could be subject to new rules.] 
MB: The provisions for retroactivity 
have two parts: dealing with cases in the 
futureand thoseinprocessat the time the 
legislation comes into force. There are 
moral and practical limits on applying 
the retroactivity provisions. 
If the management of immigration 
works as intended, we shouldn't need 
the retroactivity provisions. They are 
really a backup-for use if things get out 
of hand-if there are too many cases in 
the system that we don't want to come 
forward as subsequent landings. 
We might apply the retroactivity 
criteria to a situation in which a person 
has submitted an application,but hasnot 
yet heard from the government. As long 
as people understand the system, I 
would argue that the system is fair and 
able to withstand challenge. We do need 
more precise language, for instance, we 
shouldlimit ourselves by class. We could 
say that we won't apply retroactivity to 
immediate families or Convention 
refugees. Concerning groups already in 
process, we should say that it shouldn't 
apply to people past a certain stage in the 
process. 
Concerning the existing case-load, 
the intent is to permit a policy shift to 
rebalance the program. Over the past few 
years there was a huge inflation in the 
family-based movement that squeezes 
out other immigration. Broadly, the 
legislation seeks to increase 
opportunities for policy redirection. 
Retroactivity can speed that process. We 
are not going to disqualify refugees or 
immediate family. The only group that 
may be subject to retroactivity is the 
independent, point-tested group. I'm 
onlyreferring to those who have notbeen 
already encouraged by us. The smaller 
the group, the less our rationale for 
applying retroactivity provisions. We 
have given ourselves broad authority in 
these amendments. It couldbe limited in 
the legislation by class and the stage in 
the process. 
CONTROUENFORCEMENT 
Detention 
[A senior immigration oficer (SIO) may 
order individuals detainedpendingexecution 
ofa deportation order or exclusion order i f  it 
is possible that they might endanger public 
safety or i f  they are not likely to appear for 
removal. Individuals may be detained for 
failing to comply with a departure order. The 
weekly review of detainees by an adjudicator 
has been eliminated. Reviews will now occur 
only every thirty days. The initialforty-eight- 
hour review remains unaffected.] 
GJ: The thirty days concerns me as being 
a particularly long period of time. [What 
happens if] a lawyer was unable to get to 
someone in the first seventy-two hours? 
From a practical perspective, seventy- 
two hours is not a long time. I wonder if 
there could be any flexibility? 
JB: The flexibility is t h e r m n e  could 
request an adjudicator to review 
detention before the thirty-day time 
period. 
JH: It strikes me that there should be 
some specified criteria an adjudicator 
might consider on an earlier review. The 
legislation could make provision for an 
earlier review in the event that 
information of type x, y or z were to be 
presented, so that it's not a matter of 
absolute discretion. 
JB: I could see that it would be useful to 
have some criteria, either in the 
legislation or regulations. 
JH: I think the Act should at least make 
reference to the duty of adjudicators to 
examine the merits of an application for 
review over the course of the thirty days. 
Medical Inadmissibility 
[The medical criteria would exclude only 
those whose health condition is a danger to 
Canadians or who would cause excessive 
demands on health or social services. 
Specification of what conditions may cause 
such dangersldemands (including 
disabilities) would no longer be included in 
the Act.] 
AR: I see a general tendency to relegate a 
number of critical decisions to 
regulations. Is there any assurance of 
protection against abuse regarding 
medical inadmissibility? For example, 
I'm thinking of the British case where 
medical examinations have been used to 
determine whether or not female 
fiancees are virgins. If they're not, they 
are excluded on the grounds that they're 
not genuine fiancees at all, that they are 
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just people coming in for a 
pseudomamage in order to get into the 
country, That's been a matter for some 
serious concern. There are other ways 
that medical exams can be intrusive and 
abusive, and there are new technologies 
that open up all kinds of possibilities. I 
know that the intent is quite benign, but 
when you're writing legislation, you 
have to ensure that some person in the 
future will not abuse it. 
I wonder if we could explore the use 
of regulations a little more. It seems a lot 
of things are left to discretion. Could you 
tell us what protections or safeguards 
there might be? 
JB: The reference to the regulations was 
intended not to relegate from the Act to 
the regulations, but to [acknowledge in 
the regulations] what is currently 
medical examiners' administrative 
practice. It should provide further 
protection against not abuse, perhaps, 
but the possibility of capricious decision 
making. The purpose of the examination 
is toidentify medicalconditions that may 
endanger society or cause excessive 
demand [on health or social services]. 
AR: There is potentially an enormously 
wide ground on which people could be 
excluded if it is deemed that they might 
make excessive demands on a service, 
and the term "social service" is not even 
as precise as "health service." I think that 
whole section is potentially open to all 
kinds of interpretation and, therefore, of 
abuse. 
JB: Let me give you an example. One case 
I can think of is of a child who was 
suffering from a mental disability, who 
was seeking admission as a visitor. She 
was initially refused on the basis of 
demands on social services, without a 
distinction made between her being a 
visitor as opposed to an immigrant. In 
the wording of the amendments, you 
could prescribe not only which social 
services are in short supply or expensive, 
but also distinguish between the type of 
status a person is seeking, which right 
now the Act doesn't do. 
JH: I have a question about medical 
inadmissibility as it relates to 
Convention refugees. There is a clause 
indicating that a medical exam may be 
required of everyone who applies as a 
Convention refugee. Is this simply to 
identify conditions for the purpose of 
treatment, or is this linked to the issue of 
admissibility in a way that I haven't yet 
divined from the rest of the Bill? 
JB: I can assure you it's the former-to 
identify medicalconditions that ought to 
be treated for the benefit of the claimant 
and in some cases for the general benefit 
of society, but not to exclude those 
determined to be Convention refugees. 
'T see a general tendency to 
relegate a number of critical 
decisions to regulations." 
They do not have to meet the medical 
inadmissibility requirements. 
This provision responds to the 
concern, especially here in Toronto, of 
some instances of tuberculosis 
transmitted among school children who 
were not medically examined upon 
arrival. The provision sets a time limit for 
the examination to be conducted as soon 
as the person arrived and not, as is 
currently the case, at the time of referral 
to the Refugee Division. 
Criminal Inadmissibility 
[Individuals without criminal records would 
be barredfrom Canada ifit is determined that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe they 
have committed a serious crime outside 
Canada, People who are or were members of 
an organization involved in serious crime 
anywhere in the world would be barredfrom 
Canada. Similar provisions would apply to 
suspected terrorists and terrorist 
organizations. Those who are believed to be 
involved in espionage, subversion, terrorism 
or who are members of an organization that 
might in thefuture engage in these activities 
would be barred from Canada.] 
HA: We know there are jurisdictions 
where this has been abused. 
JH: I think this may raise a void for 
vagueness argument. The courts may 
find [such a broad] generic description of 
persons who have associated with 
criminal organizations to offend the 
Charter. This language is unusually 
broad, I think that's the risk-not the 
concept itself, which makes sense to me, 
but the language, which is very 
sweeping. 
MB: If you have anidea of how toconfine 
the sweep, while maintaining the ability 
to deal with gangs and those types of 
things, we would like to get your advice. 
BA: On a separate issue, there appears to 
be a technical drafting problem on page 
21 that crops up two or three times. 
You're talking about an indictable 
offence in S.l9(2)(a), for which the 
defendant would be prosecuted by 
summary conviction. I'mnot sureif what 
is meant here is what's known as a mixed 
or hybrid offence. 
JB: That's what we are refemng to. 
BA: It could be interpreted ambiguously 
as either an indictable offence or a 
summary offence. If it really does refer to 
summary cases, as is not currently the 
case, it could have substantial 
implications for refugees, for instance 
those convicted of shoplifting offences. 
JB: The intent is to cover the hybrid 
offences, regardless of which process is 
used. The judicial interpretation right 
now is that a hybrid offence, if 
proceeding by summary conviction, is a 
summary conviction for the purposes of 
the section. 
EV: Particularly with reference to 
terrorists-do these criteria apply to 
overseas visa officers as well, or just 
people coming to Canada? 
JB: Yes, they apply to visa officers as 
well, in that they cannot issue a visa to 
someone who is inadmissible. 
AA: How would this provision have 
applied toMugabe, the PrimeMinister of 
Zimbabwe, when he was the leader of 
the liberation movement in Rhodesia? 
Would he have been admitted? 
JB: There are quite a lot of people who 
would have been or still are covered by 
this provision, but for whom admission 
would be reasonable. That's why there's 
also a provision for the Minister to 
authorize a person to come in. That is to 
cover exceptions. It was suggested that 
there area lot of worldleaders that would 
be caught within those provisions 
because the organizations they once 
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belonged to still advocateviolence in one 
form or another. 
GJ: I cannot think of a terrorist act that is 
not covered somewhere in the Criminal 
Code, so why do we need a separate 
"We are not going to 
dIsqualzB refugees or 
immediate family. 
The only group that may be 
subject to retroactive Is the 
independent, point-tested 
group." 
provision? It seems redundant. I believe 
there's a provision in the Act now that 
deals with people engaged in organized 
crime, which I gather is the real purpose 
of the provision. So what was wrongwith 
the old provisions? 
JB: The old provisions required that the 
person be likely to commit an offence 
within Canada. There is a concern that 
we ought to protect the broader 
community against people who would 
use Canada as a refuge from legitimate 
prosecution. 
AR: Would we be right in assuming that 
this clause and others had to be read in 
the context of those relating to 
internationalagreements, whichtin turn, 
we ought tobelookingat inthecontext of 
modern computerized technologies, 
databanks, sources of information about 
organizations and individuals that will 
in the future enable individuals to be 
identified almost instantaneously as 
having at one time belonged to an 
organization, etc.? 
JB: You're referring to Section 108.1, I 
assume. 
AR: Well, individually these clauses can 
be defended, but when you put them in 
the broader context, particularly in 
relation to the international agreement, 
there are some philosophical questions 
that this raises, which make some of us 
feel very uneasy. The present 
government perhaps doesn't want to 
pursue McCarthy-like witch-hunts, but 
we don't know what some future 
government of Canada or any other 
country might wish to do. These clauses, 
combined with the international 
agreements and the technologies that are 
now available, have some serious 
consequences that may not always be 
benign. 
HA: One of the bigissuesis human rights 
in the interstate sphere. If a person is 
alleged to belong to a terrorist 
organization or a criminal organization 
[and enters the country], Interpol 
informs Canada. People have no way of 
defending themselves and suddenly 
they can't move. They get frozen and 
there's no protection of their rights-a 
hearing or anything. That's the dilemma 
for a country that believes in protecting 
human rights. The question I thinkTony 
is leading tois not the legitimate desire to 
keep criminals out of the country, but the 
potential for abuse. I don't think this is 
dealt with. If it's not, can we do 
something to improve that? 
JB: It is dealt with to the degree that a 
person cannot be removed from Canada 
without an opportunity to defend 
himself against the allegation. 
HA: But that's once they're here. What 
about applicants? What about the case of 
someone who has no rights to access the 
information, to appeal the information, 
to have independent adjudication or any 
protection while the country is cartying 
out a very legitimate intention? Some 
countries, including Canada, can 
potentially abuse it. Any group could be 
branded as terrorists at any time. That's 
a danger, and one of the traditions of 
human rights is to protect people from 
the dangers of the excesses of 
government. Can you put in some 
protective mechanisms to prevent 
abuse? Do you have to depend on 
goodwill and good judgement? 
GJ: If membership is enough, there 
doesn't have to be any nexus between 
them and the alleged activity. At what 
point do organizations become 
contaminated by individual members? 
At what point is an organization seen to 
have a common intent? There are all 
kinds of questions, regardless of the 
process they are entitled to. 
MB: But do you have any specific 
proposals? There is no intent on behalf of 
the Department to catch someone who is 
not likely to cause any sort of threat. The 
problem is trying to develop the 
language. 
GJ: My first suggestion is that there be 
some nexus between the actual activity 
and the individual, rather than the 
individual and the organization. 
MB: Of course, membership is 
something you can objectively ascertain, 
whereas activity puts a much greater 
burden on the person who's looking at 
the case and on the government. 
JB: It's been done to some degree in S. 
19(1)(1) provisions, where individuals 
are identified as senior members or 
officials of governments engaged in 
terrorism, etc. We have been able to 
idenhfy criteria there. 
MB: Is there another way of narrowing, 
[specifying instead] the kinds of people 
we would not want to apply this to, the 
kinds of situations that demand a 
different kind of protection? 
JH: I actually have sympathy for using 
membership as a ground for exclusion 
because in many instances, such as 
organized crime, it is virtually 
impossible to pin a particular deed to a 
"These clauses, combined 
with the international 
agreements and the 
technologies that are now 
available, have some serious 
consequences that may not 
always be benign." 
particular individual. I think the problem 
is the use of the word "terrorism," which 
is not a precise term. It is not a term of art. 
I would keep the membership principle, 
but try to define precisely what we are 
concerned about in terms of collective 
behaviourthat ought tolead toexclusion. 
There are other standards whose 
meanings are clear, as opposed to 
terrorism. A terrorist, a freedom 
fighter-how do you tell the difference? 
It depends on who you are at what point 
in history. I think that is a point we need 
to resolve. 
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JB: We have a definition of a terrorist that 
would say that your freedom fighter and 
my terrorist are the same person, It 
doesn't make a distinction. 
JH: That's my concern. 
HA: I think Jim has made a very good 
suggestion, reconsidering the term 
"terrorism" and using more standard, 
internationally accepted terms that are 
clearer and better defined in law. 
JH: Ironically, I think you can actually 
find some guidance in substantive 
refugee law, where we have had to 
[distinguish between] legitimate versus 
illegitimate use of force in addressing 
exclusion issues. Some of the substantive 
standards in Canadian case law would 
actually lead to a more precise definition. 
EV: I'm curious as to the intent behind 
the new 19(l)(k) regarding persons 
constituting a danger to the security to 
Canada. Who are you talking about? 
JB: It refers to those who don't fall within 
one of the other groups, but who would 
still pose a danger, as assessed by the 
federal court. 
GJ: With respect to the definition of 
terrorism, youmight want to thinkabout 
whether it is redundant, or whether it 
couldbe phrasedin termsof the Criminal 
Code so that specific acts are covered. 
Secondly, a more narrow definition of 
the word "organization" or a clarification 
might be a way of narrowing it, so that 
we don't capture people on the periphery 
of an organization. Perhaps some kind of 
common intent requirement? 
Carrier Responsibilities 
[Airlines would be required to pay the 
removal costs of someone not admitted. They 
would be required to ensure that their 
passengers havevalid travel documents up to 
the time they approach an immigration 
officer. Airlines would be charged 
administrative fees for transporting 
individuals with improper documents. They 
would be required to put up security deposits. 
Aircraft could be confiscated if fees are not 
paid. The Act provides for penalties for 
knowingly or unknowingly abetting in the 
transport of those with invalid documents.] 
HA: Trying to get the carriers to carry out 
immigration policy is an old pattern. This 
is much more drastic-what are our 
concerns? 
ML: I am surprised that the Canadian 
government would expect and be able to 
put faith in passenger agents having the 
ability to screen documents. With the 
number of airlines there are in the world, 
this is almost unenforceable. It sounds 
extraterritorial. 
JH: We're dealing with something much 
bigger than Canada. This is something 
common to virtually every industri- 
alized state. I've heard someone make 
the comment that more refugee 
determination is done by airline officials 
than by formal determination 
authorities. That is clearly true. The issue 
who ought to be screened out? It does 
sound like a delegation of our 
Convention responsibilities to airline 
officials, who are clearly not adequately 
trained to perform that task. What kind 
of training is provided vis-8-vis persons 
without documents who may have a 
genuine refugee claim? 
JB: [The airline's] job is to identify 
whether the person has the document or 
not. If not, they are not supposed to let 
that person on the plane. 
JH: That's a really fundamental problem. 
It's completely illegitimate to engage in 
this kind of indirect refoulement. There 
has to be a distinction made between a 
visitor or immigrant who is undocu- 
'A  terrorist, a freedom fighter-how do you tell the diflerence? 
It depends on who you are at what point in history. 
I think that is a point we need to resolve." 
is whether or not Western states are 
prepared to see territorial claims being 
made, or do they wish to see all persons 
stopped abroad? 
BA: In the past, the airlines have flouted 
the old provision. Many have ignored 
thembecause they were so awkward and 
difficult. If we're going to have 
provisions, one would hope that they 
would be reasonable. I favour beefing up 
enforcement provisions, provided that 
actual provisions are reasonable in terms 
of expectations of airlines and what they 
can do. 
JB: Certainly the Department has made 
a great effort to assist in training airline 
passenger agents with respect to what 
docurnentsare acceptableincanada. We 
are moving towards machine-readable 
documentation that should make it 
easier on the airlines. The major change is 
to move the process of penalties from 
prosecuting on a case-by-case basis to an 
administrative policy. 
JH: Has there been some thought given 
to the process of ensuring that passenger 
agents do not screen out persons who 
may havelegitimate Convention refugee 
claims, but who don't possess valid 
travel documents? Does the training 
emphasize that these are not the people 
mented versus people who are legally 
entitled to make refugee claims. 
JB: They are entitled to make a refugee 
claim where they are, not in Canada, not 
somewhere they hope to be. Very few 
people come directly to Canada from 
their state of origin. The screening we're 
doing is by and large not anywhere near 
their state of origin-the screening that's 
done in Europe and the US. I'm not 
talking about screening done in Sri Lanka 
or in Kenya or wherever people first start 
their journey by air to Canada. 
JH: I just thinkit'simportant that people 
get the same message in their training 
that I try to give to the IRB members, 
which is, in many cases, that the absence 
of adequate documentation is indicative 
of a genuine refugee claim, and hence 
people who are at the front line ought to 
be taking that into account. 
HA: Iwouldargue that youcan't put that 
onus of responsibility onto someone who 
is doing visas. 
JH: That's my point. 
HA: Yes, the question becomes not what 
the carrier should do, but what 
protection can be afforded and what 
responsibility Canada has for people 
who are in other jurisdictions or who 
may indeed be refugees, but who can't 
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access our system because they don't 
have proper documents, etc. 
JH: Until we get to the point of a new 
refugee regime that is premised on 
genuine burden sharing, each signatory 
state has an independent responsibility. 
It may be different in five years or even 
two, but today each signatory has an 
independent responsibility, and it is 
inappropriate for any signatory state to 
deny entry to a person who may have a 
genuine claim to Convention refugee 
status. We may be moving to another 
position, but we're not there yet. I think 
that, unfortunately, the harmonization 
of procedures is preceding the 
substantive agreement on burden 
sharing. 
Inquiries, Fingerprinting 
[Inquiries are to be public, but, where 
considered necessary, confidentiality will be 
assured.] 
HA: I think it's a very good provision to 
make inquiries public, if nobody objects. 
EV: What about the fingerprinting issue? 
What's the thinking behind that? 
JB: Yes, the vast majority are 
fingerprinted or could be. At a port of 
entry you can fingerprint those who 
don't have documentation or those 
against whom you make removal orders. 
The claimants who are not fingerprinted 
today are in-status claimants and those 
with conditional departure notices. 
We're making fingerprinting a universal 
system. 
HA: Apparently the Minister will be 
proposing a change, announced on 
"Cross-Country Checkup," that 
fingerprinting records will be destroyed 
once a refugee is landed. Once they're 
through the process, they are treated as 
any other Canadian, which1 thought was 
a very reasonable suggestion. 
GJ: Those who work frequently with 
refugeesreact to the hype that surrounds 
[the provision]. We know that 65 percent 
of claims are accepted. It seems negative 
and unfortunate. The rationale is 
misplaced. 
MB: It is a big provincial issue, though- 
the issue of multiple welfare claims. 
There are indications of duplicate and 
triplicate claims. There is a broader 
problem that needs to be addressed. 
HA: It's really a marketing problem. In 
Sweden, businessmen are fingerprinted, 
allowing them elite processing. If it's 
thought of as a right, as opposed to a 
criminal sanction, there would be no 
problem. 
GJ: I agree that criminality ought to be a 
red herring. The concern is that it's not 
seen that way in the public eye. 
Family Class and Independent 
Immigrants 
AR: I am concerned about the 
stereotypical definition of a family. As a 
demographer, I don't think it's one that 
applies to most people born and raised in 
Canada and certainly doesn't apply to 
immigrants and refugees, in terms of 
generations and other relationships, 
including plural marriages. I doubt if we 
can entrench anything that defines the 
family class unless it recognizes the 
variety of different arrangements. We 
seem to be using an anachronistic 
concept. 
'Hpparently the Minkter will 
be proposing a change, 
announced on "Cross- 
Country Checkup," that 
jhgewrinting records will be 
destroyed once a refugee is 
landed. " 
MB: The definition of family class 
appears in the regulations, not the 
legislation. It'sclear that theline will shift 
over time, but it's a separate question 
from management of the streams, which 
is affected by this legislation. There is 
presently no policy intent to expand the 
family class. 
MI,: I understand why you're doing that 
in terms of encasing the family in 
regulations, but some advances were 
made during the 1986 Hawkes 
Committee concerning the definition of 
family and dependents. Is there going to 
be a parallel process where these 
advances are going to be examined 
again? 
MB: There have been changes. As a 
result of some of the changes 
implemented after that committee's 
report, there was a huge increase in the 
number of parents coming to Canada. 
However, we are not proposing to 
change the definition of family class, only 
the management of it. 
REFUGEES 
Inland Refugee Claims 
[Admissibility: Once a claim has been made, 
a senior immigration officer or adjudicator 
determines whether the claimant is 
admissible to Canada. No inquiry will beheld 
inconjunction with theSIOS determination. 
Asenior immigra tion officer has theau thority 
to decide on "straightforward" issues of 
admission, while more complex cases will be 
referred to an immigration inquiry for a 
decision by an adjudicator. I f  the claimant is 
inadmissible due to criminal inadmissibility 
provisions, a deporta tion order is issued by an 
adjudicator. I f  the claimant is inadmissible 
due to any other provisions, a conditional 
deportation order or departure order is made. 
The federal government will no longer 
provide designated counsel to claimants and 
others appearing at an inquiry. Claimants 
and others whose admissibility is determined 
by a SIO without an inquiry will not have 
legal access to a lawyer at all. 
Eligibility: A senior immigration officer will 
determine whether the claimant is eligible to 
make a claim. Under the current legislation, 
eligibility is determined at the preliminary 
inqui y by an adjudicator and amember ofthe 
Refugee Division. Under the proposed 
amendments, while considering whether 
claimants are eligible for a hearing in the 
Refugee Division, the SIO will not assess 
whether claims have a credible basis. The 
claimant will no longer have right to counsel 
at the determination of eligibility, since such 
determination will not bemadeat an inquiry. 
The grounds for ineligibility would include 
refugee status in another county, ammvul 
from a safe third county, repeat claims, and 
criminal and security reasons. These criteria 
are not substantially different from the 
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current legislation, except as they reflect 
changes to criminal inadmissibility. Where 
the claimant is alleged to belong to a 
criminally inadmissibleclass, the SIOcannot 
makethedetemzination until theallegation is 
confirmed by an adjudicator.] 
JB: The criminality provisions are 
adapted to the eligibility criteria in a way 
so that you cannot exclude a person from 
the refugee status determination process 
because of the possibility that the person 
has committed an offence. The person 
has to be convicted in order to be 
excluded. 
GJ: There are provisions for exclusion 
[with regard to] serious nonpolitical 
crimes, crimes against humanity and war 
'Tt does sound like a 
delegation of our 
Convention responsibilities 
to airline officcials, who are 
clearly not adequately 
trained to perjom that task." 
crimes. There's also a prosecution as 
opposed to persecution element in the 
definition itself, so there are safeguards 
built into the definition that would have 
the effect of barring the person from 
having his or her refugee claim 
determined on its merits. 
JB: But the eligibility criteria are linked to 
the requirements of Article 33 of the 
Convention. Basically, we take the 
approach that if a person can be 
removed, notwithstanding the fact that 
he's determined to be a Convention 
refugee, then we do not need to make a 
determination. 
JH: A big part of the three years they 
spent drafting this Refugee Convention 
was spent dealing with these kinds of 
problems-the criminality exclusions. 
The reason that criminality exclusion 
was built into the definition was to 
ensure that the authority examining the 
merits of the claim to protection be the 
body that determines whether or not the 
criminality outweighed or failed to 
outweigh the need for protection. So 'I 
think Greg is raising quite an important 
issue of principle: whether these issues 
ought to be determined at the outset in 
the absence of all the facts that may 
constitute the refugee claim, or whether 
now that Canada finally has the 
Convention-derived exclusions built 
into our domestic definition, it isn't better 
to simply leave that determination as the 
Convention proposed: to the 
determination authority. 
HA: That's the key issue. 
JB: That's a philosophical question that 
was answered by Parliament in 1987-88. 
JH: It wasandit wasn't. At the same time 
as these exclusionary requirements were 
established, Parliament gave the Board 
the jurisdiction to deal with issues of this 
kind in the context of refugee status 
determination. I thinkthat is aproblem- 
the Board's role is very unclear, given 
that the upfront exclusion appears to fall 
to other parties. 
HA: One of the interpretations of the 
provisions is that it has given 
immigration officers much more power 
to deny people access to the refugee 
determination'system. The way the Act 
is wordedappears toaffect eligibility and 
who can get into the system. Tell us what 
you think it says and what authority the 
immigration officers do and do not have. 
ML: Would you also indicate where 
your default position is? If in doubt, does 
it mean the SIO gets the case or the 
adjudication officer? 
JB: The jurisdiction of the senior 
immigration officer is very precisely 
defined with respect to admissibility: 
lack of documentation; persons who 
return without consent; and persons 
without status in Canada. All other cases 
go to inquiry, by default, with no 
discretion. With respect to the eligibility 
criteria on criminality, the SIO makes the 
ultimate determination on whether the 
person is eligible to make a claim, but it's 
basedon the adjudicator's determination 
of whether the person is criminally 
inadmissible to Canada, so there's no 
discretion on the part of the officer. 
GJ: Can I paint a picture of what I 
extrapolate from the Bill about what will 
happen at the port of entry when people 
come in? They will get off the plane and 
go to first primary immigration. They 
will then be referred to secondary 
immigration for inspection and will be 
examinedby animmigrationofficer who 
will write a report indicating that they 
came to Canada for whatever reasons, 
and that they don't have proper 
documentation, or whatever. The 
immigration officer will then refer the 
case to a SIO who will interview the 
person further and then conclude with 
respect to eligibility. Conceivably this 
could all happen in a couple of hours. It 
would all take place within the confines 
of the airport immigration offices, 
without any right to access counsel, 
whether a lawyer, a friend or parent. 
There are two very substantive 
issues. The officer makes a determination 
with respect to the allegation in the 
report, and also respecting eligibility. 
What concerns me about this situation is 
that the allegation might be 
straightforward, but the fadual basis for 
the allegation may not be. For example, 
"Basically, we take the 
approach that if a person 
can be removed, 
notwithstanding the fact that 
he's determined to be a 
Convention refugee, then we 
do not need to make a 
determination. " 
just off the top of my head, if an 
immigration officer finds in the airport 
washroom a passport or a travel 
document issued by the Federal 
Republic of Germany and that person in 
that photograph might be the person 
sitting in front of him, then that senior 
immigration officer may conclude that 
this person is not eligible because they 
have status in a prescribed, safe third 
country. If the person denies havingheld 
the passport, it could be a serious factual 
dispute over which the SIO has 
jurisdiction without any input from 
counsel, any assistance to the person 
concerned, etc. 
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JB: I don't doubt that there may be 
disputes of fact. But they are still 
straightforward issues. If you have a 
passport that appears to have your 
picture in it and you appear at an airport 
at the same time, chances are you came 
together. 
HA: I agree with giving the immigration 
officer the right to make a judgement like 
that. If they can't make that kind of a 
judgement, what kind of a judgement 
are you giving them to make? A a 
lawyer you could contend that every act 
is a disputable thingand as a philosop I er 
I would agree, but that doesn't mean in 
practice every fact can be disputable. I 
am interested in situations that are 
problematic or that would allow an 
immigration officer to exclude a genuine 
refugee claimant. These new accessibility 
and eligibility provisions strengthen the 
officers' hands, don't they? 
JB: It gives jurisdiction to the officer that 
he doesn't have today to make decisions 
of whether the person is eligible to make 
a claim. The questions of eligibility may 
not be that straightforward. 
AR: Your earlier point, Jim, as I 
understand it, was that the present 
legislation, by allowing more time to 
inquire into evidence, do more research 
and cross-examinations, etc., gives alittle 
bit of breathing space. This is in contrast 
to the proposed amendments, under 
which someone can say you're going to 
get on the next plane to leave, on the basis 
of potentially incomplete information. 
JB: There is only one situation where that 
can happen with respect to a person 
claiming refugee status: if the person has 
come from a country with which we 
actually do have a burden-sharing 
agreement. 
If a person comes to Canada from a 
country that is prescribed under 
S.l14(l)(s), that person is ineligible. 
Concerningremoval, a claimant can only 
be removed immediately if the country 
through which he travelled is a 
prescribed country under S.ll4(l)(s) and 
Canada has an agreement with that 
country. Otherwise the removal order 
cannot be executed for seven days. I think 
the most likely scenario is that there will 
be a prescription only where there is an 
agreement. 
JH: I have a couple of queries on aspects 
of eligibility. The Bill as it is now drafted 
doesn't appear to take account of the 
following scenario: a refugee from 
country A finds protection in country B 
and at some subsequent stage becomes 
at riskincountry B, andcomes to Canada. 
The way the criteria of S.46.01 are now 
drafted, this person is returnable to 
country B, which will still admit him, 
even though he may have a well- 
founded fear of persecution there. That's 
got to be a mistake. I'm sure that could 
not have been the intent of the draft, 
assuming that a person cannot safely 
retum to a state in which he formerly 
found asylum. The easy answer to this 
JH: If the person finds protection in state 
8, he is ineligible to come to Canada so 
long the state B protects him. That's clear 
and I have no problem-that's the way it 
should be. But if the person is a national 
of A, has resided in B, and has a fear of 
persecution in each, he is absolutely 
entitled to have his claim determined in 
Canada or any other state. 
JB: I disagree. On the basis of the 
Convention, it says that not having a 
country of nationality is outside the 
country of the person's former habitual 
residence. If the person is a citizen of 
country A, then he is not without a 
country of nationality. 
"The whole rejhgee community is afraid of this. That the 
government's intention is to send people back, not giving a damn 
if they are protected or not, to countries where they do have a 
well-founded fear of persecution." 
problem is the retention of Section 
46.01(2) of the Act asit exists today, which 
makes it clear that a person who claims a 
fear of persecution in the second state 
will have his claim determined by 
Canada. I think we certainly need to 
reinsert that in this draft. 
JB: Well, there is no mistake. 
JH: You're intending to return that 
person? 
JB: We are intending to return that 
person. 
JH: Well that's breach of international 
law and you can't do that. If a person has 
a well-founded fear of persecution, either 
in a country of nationality or of former 
habitual residence.. . 
JB: Only if he is no longer a citizen of his 
country. 
JH: No, we are presupposing that he has 
a well-founded fear of persecution in 
state A. We are now saying that there is 
no longer protection in state B. He can 
safely retum neither to A nor to B, but 
you're suggestingthat he isnot eligible to 
have his claim adjudicated in Canada? 
JB: Even if he were eligible, the Board 
could not find him to be a Convention 
refugee with respect to country B. 
JH: So what is the solution for the 
individual that I just put before you? You 
ship him into orbit, or back to the country 
where he was persecuted? 
HA: It's against the very principle of the 
Act. 
JH: This is not right, John. I mean the 
drafting is not right. 
JB: It is not a mistake. The intent will be 
to give the person a Ministeis permit. 
JH. Why are you going to go that route 
rather than recognizing that this is a 
person who has a well-founded fear of 
persecution instate A andcan't live in the 
state where he formerly had protection? 
JB: The question is whether the person 
can make a claim and whether it makes a 
difference if he can make a claim and the 
answer is, given the definition of the 
Convention refugee, it would make no 
difference. The Board could not find him 
to be a Convention refugee with respect 
to country B. 
HA: You are just dead wrong on that. I 
was just reading some decisions sent to 
me from Australia. 
JH: You're saying that giving a person a 
permit is the legal, factual equivalent of 
granting that person refugee status, 
which is just wrong. 
- 
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JB: I don't suggest that. 
JH: Well, you're granting a person a very 
inferior form of discretionary protection 
that carries with it none of the rights of 
the Refugee Convention, nor the rights 
that accrue to refugees under this Act, 
which allow access to permanent 
residence. I won't pursue this, I assumed 
this was a simple point, that you just left 
out 46.01(2), which was in the Act- 
which was there intentionally last time 
around-to protect against this situation. 
HA: The point is, why not do it properly? 
What you are doing is telling us that the 
intention is to not enforce the spirit and, 
I would also argue, the law of the 
Convention. The whole refugee 
community is afraid of this. That the 
government's intention is to send people 
back, not giving a damn if they are 
protected or not, to countries where they 
do have a well-founded fear of 
persecution. 
JB: No, it is not our intent. I am saying 
that the person cannot be determined to 
be a Convention refugee with respect to 
country B if he is a citizen of country A. 
HA: Is it possible that your legal 
interpretation in that regard is wrong? Is 
that possible? 
JB: I suppose it is always possible. 
HA: Now if it is possible that it is wrong, 
would you agree to review it just that 
much, to say let me raise a reasonable 
doubt in my mind that I may be wrong 
and we consider the other possible 
interpretations of the Act that I just heard 
and consider whether this section should 
go back in? 
JB: If it went back in, it certainly would 
not be in the form that it is in right now. 
JH: Okay, it only needs a three-word 
change: "A person is eligible to have 
claim determined by the Refugee 
Division if the person claims a well- 
founded fear of persecution ... in the 
country that recognized the person as a 
refugee." Very straightforward-you 
change three words in the existing 
provision and it works. Look, the 
number of people we are talking about is 
very small in any event. The whole 
rationale of this Convention is that where 
the person is formallyreturnable to some 
state, you have to assess whether or not 
there is a good reason to prevent that 
return; if the person is formally stateless 
and has no state to which he is returnable, 
the claim is to be examined under the 
Statelessness Convention. Anindividual 
who is formallyreturnable both to A and 
to B, under my scenario, has to have his 
claim assessed to determine whether or 
not there is a good reason based on fear of 
persecution for a Convention reason to 
grant that person protection. It is logical 
to protect him, it is humane to protect 
him and the downside cost is negligible 
because we are not talking about a big 
group- 
MB: If I am from Sri Lanka and have 
been living in Germany, I applied for my 
claim and suddenly I find that there is an 
outbreak of violence. I acknowledged 
that Germany has given me protection, 
but the conditions are no longer safe and 
some of the regions are not so keen on 
encouraging the police to protect, so now 
I would like Canada to accept my claim. 
"Concerning the existing 
case-load, the intent is to 
permit a policy shift to 
rebalance the program. 
Over the past few years there 
was a huge inJlation in the 
family-based movement that 
squeezes out other 
immigration." 
Under the scenario that you described, 
does that mean that the claim would not 
be adjudicated? 
JH: It would be adjudicated. One has to 
consider the adequacy of protection in 
terms of Convention standards. These 
questions have to be looked at, that's all 
I am suggesting. 
HA: But it can't be done by an officer. 
JH:Thisis thekind of situation that ought 
to be dealt with by the Board. 
JB: That would require a lot more 
amendments to the Act because we have 
to give the jurisdiction to the Board to 
make those decisions and they don't 
have it now. 
JH: Well, the Board perceives itself to 
have that jurisdiction and has exercised it 
over the last two years. Section 46.01(2) 
specifically addresses the scenario of a 
refugee who is at risk in the county in 
which he has found asylum. 
JB: They can only adjudicate the claim 
with respect to the country of origin. 
They may find the person to be a refugee 
in Sri Lanka. 
JH: Currently, if an individual applying 
as a refugee vis-a-vis state A by virtue of 
46.01(2), state B is excluded as a site of 
removal, hence the person would be 
protected as a refugee from A. 
JB: But if they're making an assessment 
with respect to whether the person has a 
valid claim with respect to the country of 
asylum, then they do not have 
jurisdiction. 
JH: If 46.Ol(2) effectively eliminates B as 
a site of removal, then assessment of the 
claim against A is all that is required in 
order to protect a person. The Board 
should provide protection for the person 
who canbe returned to no country safely, 
and that's the bottom line here. 
JB: I'm not saying that it is not anissue- 
but a muchgreater issue than the one you 
suggest. 
JH: It is and it isn't. I am questioning 
whether, given that the prescribed list 
concept is going to be superimposed on 
the Convention, the Board ought not to 
retain the residual jurisdiction to 
entertain the claims of people who 
cannot be returned to a prescribed 
country by reason of fear of persecution? 
JB: Well, I guess that is the issue here 
then. 
JH: I think the prescribed list concept is 
highly problematic; that is a muchbigger 
question. But if a person cannot safelybe 
returned to any state-A or B-then the 
Board not only can, but has a duty to 
determine that claim. 
JB: I think you mixed the two provisions 
here. Let's talk about the US. You have 
a person who comes up here from the 
US. and who has never made a claim to 
the U.S. The US. is prescribed, so that 
person is ineligible and that person goes 
back. This person's brother happens to 
be a Convention refugee in the US. He 
comes up and is ineligible because he has 
protection in the US. But say he fears 
persecution in the U.S. and in your 
scenario he goes on to the Board. 
Refuge, Vol. 12, No. 2 (July 1992) 13 
JH: He shouldbe heardby theBoard, but 
that doesn't guarantee he will be 
recognized as a refugee. It depends on 
whether he is adequately protected in 
the US. 
JB: Well, under the wording of the Act as 
it stands right now, if he went on to the 
Board, the Board could only make a 
deasion with respect to his country of 
origin and that's all they do now. No 
dispute on that. 
JH: I am not disagreeing. You determine 
a claim of a person who has a country of 
nationality with regard to that country. 
Then one comp to the issue of whether 
opening to serious abuse? My sense is 
that the number of people who might 
abuse it could not be that large, and that 
the judgement should be made by a 
Refugee Board. 
JH: Even if John's interpretation were 
right, we come to the second question: 
does it make any sense not to retain 
S.46.01(2), given that it provides an easy 
safeguard? 
JB: I think it is too easy a safeguard, that 
is my concem. 
JH: I don't think that a safeguard can be 
too easy. 
'1 see a fundamental contradiction in this Act between shared 
responsibil@ and safe third countries. Safe third counhy is a 
beggar-thy-neighbour ideology. It's a way of unilaterally saying 
that the problem is not ours." 
or not there is a second state to which the 
person is returnable. Section 46.01(2) 
effectively prohibits consideration of the 
US. as such a country in the event the 
Board is convinced the person has a well- 
founded fear of persecution in country B. 
JB: That is not what the Act says. 
JH: Rather then being technocratic and 
legalistic, all I want you to do is to think 
about my scenario of a person who has a 
well-founded fear of persecution in A 
and who had protection in B, but now 
has become at risk in B. Is it logical to say 
that such person may not be protected? 
That is my only question. 
MB: That person could be dealt with 
under a Ministeis permit or it could be 
some kind of public policy provision. So 
in those instances the real issue is should 
you apply a lesser kind of test, and what 
are the policy issues that are at stake? 
HA: You translated it back to a political 
and administrative problem! It is anissue 
of human rights and an international 
Convention to which we are subject. We 
are obligated as a country to provide 
protection if returning that person to 
country A or B would endanger that 
person. Further, the determination of 
that situation should not be at the 
discretion of an immigration officer or 
even the Minister. Does this give an 
JB: You can look at it again, but I just 
think that the solution is a much more 
complex one than is suggested. 
HA: Let's get into the safe third country 
provision. We clearly have a very 
profound difference on this. 
GJ: There is one difference from the 
current Ad-the safe third country will 
not havetobeacountry that hasarefugee 
determination system. 
HA: What was the intent behind that? I 
object to the whole side. 
JB: That the country has to respect its 
obligations under Article 33 in the 
Convention. That's the key, isn't it? 
JH: No, it's not. That's my first point. A 
country can be prescribed if it complies 
with Article 33, and then you define 
compliance with Article 33 by means of 
four other things. This is a very poorly 
drafted section because complying with 
Article 33 doesn't require the four other 
things you're told to lookat. Article 33 is 
only one article in the Refugee 
Convention. It is not the Refugee 
Convention. A state that fails to comply 
with any of its obligations under the 
Convention is an inappropriate site for 
return. In other words, you can have a 
state that doesn't "refoule" people, but 
which starves them to death, tortures 
them, or denies refugee children access 
to schooling. Article 33 is the wrong 
standard. Theintent expressedinSedion 
114 (8) is more appropriate. You really 
want to know whether this a state that 
complies with its obligations under the 
Convention. There are a lot of countries 
in the world that don't send people back, 
but they do very brutal things to them. 
Technically, these states meet the test of 
Article 33 compliance, the broader 
concem of S. 114 (8) notwithstanding. 
JB: But when you're deciding to 
prescribe, you're looking at other things. 
HA: Then why make the reference to 331 
What he is saying is that there is no 
congruence in the Ad. It is bad drafting. 
You don't say Article 33, which is just a 
nonrefoulement clause, and then say in 
another section that you have to comply 
with Article 33 and refer to all kinds of 
other factors that aren't part of Article 33. 
That's just bad drafting, it's bad 
legislation. 
JH: It seems to me that we should be 
looking, first, at whether they respect the 
human rights of refugees and refugee 
claimants; secondly, do they have a 
procedure to look at refugee claims that 
meets basic international standards; 
third, will they in fact admit the person 
and let him into their process? Those are 
the three questions. That's what you 
need to say, and you can say it in a 
straightforward fashion and achieve 
your intent without this incongruent 
reference to Article 33. 
MB: You have lots of suggestions and 
some of them I gather you are going to 
use as testimony when you go to 
legislative committee. We have our own 
ideas about some things that need to be 
modified. It would be very helpful if you 
gave us whatever ideas you have before 
you present them. 
JH: I think that's fair, but I think we 
should have a two-way exchange, with 
you explaining the thinking behind 
certain provisions. Obviously the best 
route is to have you guys walk in with 
changes. 
AR: I may be way off base, but it is still 
my opinion at this stage that when you 
combine the delegationof certain powers 
to officials through regulations, 
international agreements and provincial 
agreements, with changes in the 
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Constitution regarding powers of 
provinces, we are going to end up within 
the next decade losing central federal 
control of immigration. The federal 
Parliament will have very little effective 
power-it will be in somebody else's 
hands. 
JB: The provinces have expressed an 
interest in immigration and there's no 
question that they will play a greater role 
in the future. We have made provisions 
for that; it is part of the Constitution. 
HA: I see a fundamental contradiction in 
this Act between shared responsibility 
and safe third countries. Safe third 
country is a beggar-thy-neighbour 
ideology. It's a way of unilaterally saying 
that the problem is not ours. Shared 
responsibility says that decisions about 
how we adjudicate such things are done 
by open agreements. This Act tries to 
wed the two-and it does so poorly. 
Technically and philosophically, they are 
two separate ideologies. I'd like to have 
some rationale for that kind of marriage. 
If you have shared agreements, why do 
you need safe third country? And if safe 
third country can only be implemented 
in real terms with shared agreements, 
why not delete the whole section on safe 
third countries? My final argument is 
that it is the worst public relation vis-8- 
vis the refugee support community. It is 
waving the red flag. Why not get rid of it? 
JB: As I suggested before, I don't think 
that we will see a prescribed country list 
that does not parallel a list with which we 
have agreements. 
HA: So why have it? It reads like scissors- 
\ and-paste legislation. It stands out as if 
somebody has said, "Put this in the Act. 
I need it for the Reform Party" or 
something like that. It's totally 
unnecessary and not a good thing at all. 
JH: Take one step backwards. You're 
saying shared responsibility may be a 
good thing, but safe third country is 
definitely the wrong approach. I think 
shared responsibility, as it is currently 
being conceived, is an equally bad idea. 
HA: It may be. 
JH: Of everything I object to in this Bill, 
my concerns are greatest in regard to S. 
108.1 The generic idea of everybody 
collaborating is one thing, but the 
particular forms that exist in Europe, 
and that we are talking about joining, are 
extremely dangerous and should never 
be adopted by Cabinet acting alone. Any 
treaty of this importance should be' 
presented to Parliament. 
ML: It seems to me that the specifications 
of safe third country and shared 
responsibility have a gap concerning 
Canada's geographic position and our 
positionrerefugee flows. We donothave 
many people migrating from Canada to 
elsewhere. This is nothing new. But 
shared responsibility agreements have 
tolwkat thesize of refugee flows. If there 
is a huge refugee flow coming from 
America-in terms of how do those 
countries as a group and individually 
deal with the phenomena in order to 
protect themselves and meet their 
obligations. That is a different problem 
with quite a different set of solutions. 
What Section 108.1 does is give 
legislative authority for Canada to 
participate in agreements designed to 
deal with that problem, certainly to 
Canada's benefit, and obviously also to 
the benefit of the countries with which 
we reach agreements, but not to the 
detriment of migrants. 
"The provinces have expressed an interest in immigration 
and there's no question that they will play a greater role 
in the future. We have made provisions for that; 
it is part of the Constitution." 
country X and two countries would 
agree to share that flow-how would 
that be divided up? You would have to 
be concerned about not breaking up 
families, etc. That is what I would call 
shared responsibility: taking a refugee 
flow and making some sense of how that 
can be divided. I don't see anything in 
here that addresses these questions. The 
fact is that Canada is the end point, so the 
question is only one of turning people 
back, not sharing. That means that the 
language we have is really not fitting 
with the kind immigration and refugee 
flow problem that we seem to have. 
JB: There's a different question being 
asked by Michael here and that is what is 
the objective of Canada and the 
objectives of most European countries 
with respect to worldwide migration 
pressures. The proposal here, in the 
Dublin Convention, and everything else 
that has been raised in recent years with 
respect to questions of countries of first 
asylum have not been addressing the 
type of problem that Michael is talking 
about, which is how do you deal with 
particular flows from particular places. 
The question thelegislationis addressing 
is how do you deal with the overall 
growing flow of asylum seekers into the 
countries of Europe and North 
HA: Shared responsibility is lifted out of 
some of our writing, along the lines that 
Michael talked about and what Jim was 
referring to, as a vision of the receiving 
countries assuming a collective responsi- 
bility and allocating responsibilities by 
mutual agreement among themselves. 
In order to get rid of beggar-thy- 
neighbour, we started to talk the 
language of shared responsibility, etc. 
The language is now incorporated into 
the legislation. Jim's point is that the 
phrase is being used not to mean shared 
responsibility but to mean another form 
of beggar-thy-neighbour. It's particu- 
larly important for Canada for two 
reasons. First, we are a leading country 
setting the standards. On the other hand, 
we're still a country that gets less than 
our burden share. We are thelast country 
that needs to do this stuff-we are 
geographically at the end of the pipeline. 
We're the last one in that section and 
we're the bearer of refugee standards. To 
start doing this kind of thing is horrible 
and bad. 
JH: There is even a more fundamental 
assumption underlying Michael's 
question. As the Dublin Convention is 
drafted, if Italy or Germany or some 
other participating state takes a 
disproportionate share of the overall 
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refugee flow into the contracting states' 
territory viewed as a whole, then that 
state will be compensated by the other 
contracting states. Now if you factor in 
our geographical position at the end of 
the long route to asylum, it could 
effectively mean that burden-shared 
responsibility in an agreement like 
Dublin means both fewer people coming 
as refugees to Canada, and potentially 
hundreds of million of dollars in 
payments to our partners who receive 
those people. It will be the Italians in the 
case of the Africans, the Americans in the 
case of the Central Americans etc., who 
ultimately run the determination 
procedures and either receive or reject 
the claimants. This scenario is very 
different from the idea of looking at 
relative resources, looking at the extent 
of cultural homogeneity, etc., and 
coming up witha formula that shares the 
responsibilitybroadly. It's saying, "How 
do we limit the options of claimants to 
site A as the one and only place where 
they can make a claim?" and the rest of us 
pay a price to those states that carry the 
burden. The end point of this is that 
Canada might not receive many claims 
at all. 
The Hearings 
[The preliminary inquiry would be 
eliminated. A unanimous positive decision 
on the part ofthe Refugee Division members 
is required to accept claimants who have 
without valid reason destroyed identification 
papers, those from a nonrefugee-producing 
country, and those who have returned to the 
country of alleged persecution during the 
processingoftheir claim. Most hearings will 
be open, but the panel may decide to close a 
hearing or restrict publicity about the case. I f  
the Minister chooses not to participate, the 
RefugeeDivision may decide in theclaimants 
favour without a hearing.] 
GJ: I have a couple of problems with this 
provision. In more than one place in the 
Act there seem to be penalties or a higher 
burden placed on refugee claimants that 
arrive without documents. It's part of the 
section on carrier responsibilities, and it 
even affects landing. And yet as Jim has 
already said, in many ways the hallmark 
of valid refugees is the inability to get 
valid documentation from the country 
where they fear persecution. 
JB: I don't buy the myth, but go on. 
GJ: From my experience with clients, it 
does not seem to be a myth. The fad is 
that the Refugee Board refuses refugee 
claimants if they applied for and 
obtained travel documents from their 
own government. So you might not buy 
the myth, but the Refugee Boardbuys the 
myth. Already identification is an issue, 
so I don't understand the rationale for the 
new standard. It seems as if the public is 
angry at people who come without 
documents because they think that they 
are abusing the system, so the politicians 
have put it into the Bill. 
HA: For someone who arrives without 
documents, the question is should 
Canada put all kinds of incentives and 
penalties for producing whatever 
HA: That's a separate issue. I could 
understand it. 
JH: The problem is that we're creating 
disincentives for people to be honest, 
either because their credibility is 
questioned at the hearing on the ground 
of false documents, or because they may 
be found ineligible upfront before they 
even get to the refugee hearing because 
they are carrying a passport of a 
prescribed country. Refugee claimants 
do dumb things because we've created 
such a maze of obstacles that ultimately 
the claimant doesn't know the right way 
to go about getting to Canada. 
GJ: I don't understand the connection 
between the control problem mechanism 
and the destruction of the documents. If 
the person has a well-founded fear of 
persecution in his country of origin, the 
fact that he destroyed his documents on 
the airplane does not change that fact. 
"My concern is with the method. I'm concerned thut there are 
some people who come to this country who destroy their 
documents but who are genuine refigees, who are in need of 
assistance or protection, who are going to run into a system 
where they are put to a much higher standard of proof? 
documents they have? Leave aside for 
now whether they are proper documents 
because that is a source of confusion. 
People often have to use all kinds of 
purchased and forged documents to get 
out of a country-I don't have any 
problem with that. If you come on with a 
forged document, get off with a forged 
document, show it so they can say you're 
a refugee. I have no problem with the 
government demanding that that be 
done and putting all kinds of 
inducements and penalties in the Act to 
ensure that it is done. I don't think we 
should condone the destruction of 
documents. 
JH: In theory you are absolutely right. 
But we know that we have visa controls 
on the majority of the world's refugee- 
producing countries, so if you're 
carrying the passport of such a state, you 
are not going to be able to get on a plane 
to come to Canada. 
HA: Well, I will tell you why it affects it. 
There is a problem of identification. If 
you're having refugee hearings, you 
don't want an unidentified guy coming 
u p h e  could be a criminal-making a 
refugee claim. You have no way of 
tracing him, you have all the mechanisms 
available to find out who he really is and 
where he comes from. I think the 
Canadian government should have the 
extra leverage to find out who that 
person is. I think Jim's critique is right- 
that we now send the message out that 
encourages people to disguise their 
documents. On the other hand, the 
government should be able to find out 
who in fad is sitting in front of them. 
GJ: I'll tell you something else. In the last 
week I've had two people tell me that 
your officers at the appeal office are 
alleging people committed serious 
nonpolitical crimes for having forged 
documents. Those people got off the 
airplane and handed their false 
- - 
Refuge, Vol. 12, No. 2 (July 1992) 
documents over to the immigration 
officers. 
JH: If you really want to deal with this, 
first, you reassess the visa policy on all 
refugee-producing states. Number two, 
it should be clearly understood that false 
documents do not negatively impact the 
credibility of the claimant. 
JB: That's not a reason for having to 
destroy them. 
JH: The process creates so much 
confusion that you do whatever you 
need to get on the plane and then get rid 
of whatever it was that let you get on 
board. 
HA: I think it should be the reverse. The 
idea is to get people to keep the 
documents, not destroy them. 
JH: If you want to eliminate that 
industry, eliminate the visa 
requirements on known refugee- 
producing states. 
HA: Well, there are other kinds of factors. 
I would argue that documents should 
not influence eligibility or accessibility to 
a refugee claim. This should be spelled 
out in the Act so that everyone will know 
it. It would alleviate the fear that people 
will be guilty of a criminal offence for 
holding false documents. Does that 
make sense to you? 
JB: It certainly does. The principle 
behind all the references to keeping 
documentation is designed to get people 
to produce their documents, not to their 
detrimentbut to thebenefit of thesystem. 
JH: My concern is not with the intent. I 
think that the intent in trying to identify 
people who are otherwise undocu- 
mented is valid. My concern is with the 
method. I'm concerned that there are 
some people who come to this country 
who destroy their documents but who 
are genuine refugees, who are in need of 
assistance or protection, who are going 
torun intoa system where they are put to 
a much higher standard of proof. 
HA: It didn't say they can't be, it says 
they may not be. The Bill says there will 
be higher hurdles unless you produce 
your documents. There has to be a clear 
message to the immigration officer that 
you cannot use false documents to deny 
accessibility or eligibility to enter the 
refugee system. It has to be explicit in the 
law. 
JH: The bottom line is that everyone in 
these countries of origin know that with 
their genuine documents they don't have 
a hope in hell of getting on an airline. 
HA: Ibelieve that theinducement system 
will work. Idon't thinkcarriers should be 
penalized for transporting genuine 
refugees-if you could put that in, it 
changes the whole picture. It would say 
that we're open to genuine refugees, but 
we're not open to the others. 
evidence that the system is at risk of 
abuse. Why don't we leave it the way it is 
and treat all refugees similarly whether 
they are the exception or the rule? 
GJ: I have found from my practical 
experience that the unanimity 
requirement is redundant. A client who 
breaks any of these three requirements is 
probably going to lose. If they come from 
one of those obvious countries like the 
United States or West Germany, they're 
'Tt seems to me that the speci@cahahons of safe third counlry and 
shared responsibility have a gap concerning Canada's 
geographic position and our position re refugeejlows. . . . The 
fact is that Canada is the endpoint, so the question is only one of 
turning people back, not sharing." 
JB: The standard is there, quite frankly, 
because, as you just said, you don't want 
airline check-in clerks assessing 
Convention refugee claims. 
JH: If you tie Howard's idea with Section 
45, I think you would have a workable 
piece of legislation. Part (b) is also a 
problem: persons having returned to 
their state of origin. In principle, 
everyone understands that you may 
undermine a well-founded fear by going 
back to the place where you came from. 
I think all you need here is the exact 
language that you have in (a), referring to 
those cases without a valid reason. If you 
go back to visit your dying mother, or to 
rescue your children, the international 
law criteria for cessation have not been 
met. 
Part (c) is also problematic: requiring 
a unanimous decision for persons 
coming from states declared by Cabinet 
to respect human rights. It codifies a 
skepticism towards claims that come 
from states that have not traditionally 
produced large numbers of people by 
imposing a higher adjudicative thresh- 
old. Why would we want to make the 
change just for refugees who are 
exceptions to the rule? Why impose a 
higher adjudicative threshold? If you 
look at the IRB's record, I don't think 
we've accepted a single American 
refugee claimant. There is no real 
going to lose. And if they return to their 
country of origin for any reason, 
including to see their sick mother before 
she dies, there's a very good chance 
they're going to lose. I think it's 
redundant, from my practical experi- 
ence. 
HA: The amendments Jim suggested are 
quite reasonable. 
JB: Certainly adding the valid reason is 
a legitimate point to raise, and the lack of 
criteria certainly ought to be reviewed. 
JH: I think you have to look to see if there 
really is a problem. If there were 1,000 
claims accepted from the U.S. that 
appeared to be bogus, I might 
understand your preoccupation, but I've 
looked at the IRB stats, and there hasn't 
been a refugee from the U.S., or Great 
Britain or France, none of the obvious 
countries. 
GJ: And I think it shows a real lack of 
faith in the Board members. 
JB: I think the original intent was to try 
some form of exclusion for those types of 
people, but we moved away from it, 
maybe to the point where it becomes of 
questionable value. 
HA: Maybe rather than trying to spell it 
out, it's better to drop it. It's unnecessary 
overkill. 
JB: You're right. Ultimately when you 
get into a hearing, you won't save any 
time with this unanimity provision. 
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